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A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State
University, in the words of its constitution, is:
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its members by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two
annual faculty research lectures in the fields of ( 1) the biological
and exact sciences, including engineering, called the Annual
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and (2 ) the
humanities and social sciences, including education and business
administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in
the Humanities.
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these
aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the
costs of publishing and distributing these lectures.
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in choosing lecturers are, in the words of the constitution:
( 1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; ( 2)
publication of research through recognized channels in the field
of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an extended period of years; (4) personal influence in developing the
character of the students.
James P. Shaver was selected by the committee to deliver the
Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the
members of the Association we are happy to present Professor Shaver's
paper:
Values and Schooling: Perspectives
for School People and Parents
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VALUES AND SCHOOLING
Perspectives for School People and Parents*

] ames P. Shaver
One of the most perplexing issues facing school people is posed
by the question, "What should the school's role be in regard to
students' values?" Some version of that question may even on occasion
provoke concern among parents. When they do become involved in
related disputes over what the .school should be doing - usually as
part of an aroused minority reacting to a new element in the school
program - parents are .likely to make such declarations as, "The
school has no business messing with the values of our children!"
Individually, they are likely to think, but not say aloud, "The school's
decisions and programs should reflect my values."
How does one answer such a basic question about the school's
role - or, as a school man (or woman), respond to such statements
by parents - or, decide as a parent what position to take? There is
probably no definitive answer. Yet, a consideration of values, particularly in the context of a democratic, pluralistic society, holds some
promise for providing a perspective from which parents and school
people alike can formulate reasoned individual opinions that will
be both intellectually sound and politically (in the sense of school
politics) persuasive. It is to that promise that this lecture is directed,

* A grant from the Utah State University Research Council for a project,
"Relating the Research on Values to Social Studies Education," aided materially
in the preparation of this lecture.
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not as a dissertation on the fine points of values and democratic
theory, but as an attempt to bring several years of work in the area
of values and the school curriculum to bear on a very serious question. It is hoped that what is said will be of some use to those who,
as laymen, deal with the institution of schooling as it impinges upon
us almost daily.

SCHOOLING) NOT EDUCATION
Perhaps a good place to begin is by drawing a significant and
fairly obvious, but often forgotten, distinction between education
and schooling. If we associate education with learning, then it is
clear that much (some would argue, most) of our education takes
place outside of the school. We learn from our parents, other adults,
our siblings, our peers, and from our many encounters with the
natural world. "Education," to quote from Stephens' (1967) provocative analysis of the school as an institution, "can be as broad as
life itself" (p. 20). More appropriately we might say that education
is life itself .
The school, the formal institution for education, operates within
a broad educational context. Outside of skill areas such as mathematics, other people and institutions play a more significant role
than the school, perhaps because formalizing education takes away
from its "naturalness" and
its meaningfulness. Partly
for that reason, the school's
opportunity for impact is
less certainly qualitatively, if not always quantitatively in terms of the
numbers of hours spent
within its confines.
The position of the
school vis a vis other educational influences is an
important part of the perspective from which to
view the question of the
school's role in regard to
values - in terms both of
what we (school people
and parents alike) ought
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to expect the school to do, and what we can reasonably ex peci
teachers and school administrators to accomplish. ~10re of that later.
For the moment, it is important to remember that schooling, not
education in its broader sense, is the focus of this lecture.
VALUES -

A DEFINITION

The other term central to the theme of this lecture should also
be defined. "Values" have been defined in numerous ways. We
have found it useful in our work (e.g., Oliver & Shaver, 1963,
1966; Shaver & Berlak, 1968; Shaver & Larkins, 1968, in press)
to define values as our standards or principles of worth. They are
the criteria by which we judge things (not just objects, but ideas,
actions, and situations as well) to be good, worthwhile, or desirable;
or, on the other hand, bad, worthless, or despicable; or, of course,
somewhere in between on the continua suggested by such polar
concepts.
As criteria or standards, values are ideas; but they are more.
They also embody and convey feeling. For example, honesty is a
value by which we often judge the actions of ourselves and others.
You can describe what you mean by "honest" - that is, what kinds
of behavior it entails. So, you have an idea of honesty. But you
also have feelings that go with the idea. Not only is it "good" · to
be honest, but honesty evokes positive feelings on your part; it calls
forth an emotive reaction. In that sense, values are both cognitive,
or intellectual, and affective, or emotional.
Values, Attitudes, and Biases

Values from this point of view are fundamental aspects of one's
personality that should be distinguished from attitudes. An attitude
(again, as we have found it useful to define the term) is a number
of interrelated beliefs and feelings focused on some object (perhaps
an action, situation, or concrete thing). We have attitudes toward
- for example, toward blacks or toward our next door neighbor
(who may be a, black) or toward communism, and so on. Our
attitudes are affected by a number of factors, including our factual
beliefs and our values - our standards of worth.
Values, then, underlie attitudes, and while each of us has thousands of attitudes, we have fewer values, perhaps several dozen
(see Rokeach, 1971).
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By the same token, we need to distinguish our biases - our
leanings, inclinations, or partialities - from the values upon which
they are in part, consciously or unconsciously, based. We also need
to keep in mind the distinction between prejudice - prejudgments,
judgments without adequate evidence - and values. Our prejudices,
by virtue of the neat trick of psychological compartmentalization,
are frequently not consistent with our more deeply held values. Yet,
unthinkingly, they often affect our behavior toward children, school
people, and parents.
This is not the place to belabor such distinctions. They are,
however, important aspects of a perspective from which to consider
the central question about the school and students' values. We often
fail to make clear in our own minds when our actions as school
people toward students or our demands upon the schools as parents
are based on prejudice, unconscious bias, or the careful consideration
of commitment (values).
Three Types of Values

Keeping in mind three rough categories of values - esthetic,
instrumental, and moral - can also be helpful in contemplating
our personal positions on values and schooling. Esthetic values are
those standards by which we judge personal experiences related to
pleasure, especially beauty - in art, in music, in personal appearance,
in nature, even in cookery. We all make esthetic judgments; the
connoisseur or the academician in literature and the fine arts often
develops complex judgmental systems. And each of us tends to
allow his esthetic values (in regard, for example, to classical music
or to hair style) to take on a more serious, moralistic tone. The
aesthete is frequently a snob, but prejudice based on unthinking
esthetic reactions is common to all of us.
Instrumental values are used to judge performance - whether
of equipment (Does an auto accelerate to 60 m.p.h. in twelve seconds
or less? Is a chronometer sufficiently accurate? ) , persons ( Are
Johnny's study habits adequate for college work? Is the class being
sufficiently quiet and orderly so that the teacher's objectives can be
accomplished?), or states of affairs (Is this setting sufficiently quiet
and attractive that I can work on my lecture?). These are means
values. That is, meeting them is a means to another end. In political
science, they are sometimes called procedural values. We constantly
need to raise questions about the end values sought (speed, attendance at college, the teacher's objectives, the purpose of a lecture);
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and, we also need to remember that, like esthetic values, instrumental
values often become important in and of themselves.
Thirdly, there are moral values. These are standards used to
justify decisions of ethics, decisions as to what aims or actions are
proper. For example, a person might argue that he shouldn't be
forced to go to a bridge party because he prefers not to go. Or, one
might judge a person's reaction upon finding a lost purse on the
basis of the moral value of honesty. Or, capital punishment might
be opposed in the name of a moral value, the right to life.
These three examples illustrate an important point about our
moral values. They vary widely in their importance and applicability.
At the most trite level are personal preferences: "I'd prefer not to
go." Sometimes such a statement can be explicated further: "Why
not?" "Because I'd rather spend the evening alone." No one (except
perhaps the person irritated by the refusal to play bridge) would
deny one's right to have solitude a~ a value. Nor, on the other hand,
would the recalcitrant bridge player be likely to argue that that value
was a basic right to critical importance to human existence, applicable
to all men as a universal value. This is, however, exactly the role
that a value such as the right to life is likely to play. It is not a
petty preference (petty, not in the sense of importance to one's
personal life, but in terms of what happens to mankind), and it is
the type of value that we are likely to deem critical in judging
whether the actions and aims of people in this society or in others
are leading toward a desirable existence for mankind. Such commitments will be referred to in this lecture as basic values.
Between the extremes of the right to life and personal solitude
fall many values, differing in importance and in the breadth of
applicability. Honesty for example, is usually deemed to be more
than a matter of personal preference: It is sufficiently important to
be the subject of law making; yet, it usually is not thought to be
of utmost importance in defining the essential qualities of human
existence. Also, some values are not applied to all men. For example,
a member of a particular religious faith might judge his fellow
church members by the criterion of regularity of church attendance,
but be less likely to apply such a criterion to his acquaintances who
belong to another church or to no church.
So we can think, again in rough terms, of a continuum ranging
from values that are critically important to a conception of humanness
and are applicable to all men, to values that are important and
"which we would like to see as many people as possible follow, to
those which are largely a matter of personal preference. It is vital,

-5-

as we ask what the school's role should be in regard to students'
values, to also ask, In regard to which types of values?
M ore on the Nature of Values

Other characteristics of our values are integral for a perspective adequate to viewing the school and its function in regard to students' values. But first, a couple of points need to be re-emphasized.
As already noted, categorizing values as esthetic, instrumental,
or moral is at best a rough, if useful, business. It may be difficult
to categorize some values, and they are likely to shift categories.
Especially, as already noted, esthetic and instrumental values often
take on the imperatives of moral values. Individuals are shocked
when others do not share their tastes in art, music, or personal dress.
Children are treated as "bad" because they dare talk without permission in the classroom, without asking whether such talking is
really detrimental to accomplishing the ends for which the no-talking
rule was established in the first place. On a societal level also, values
that seem procedural, or instrumental, in nature - such as a commitment to due process of law - take on the aura of end values.
Due process is accepted as good in-and-of-itself - a proper criterion
by which to judge laws and the behavior of governmental officials
(even of school officials and parents, perhaps?). And, as I shall note
shortly, all of the hasic moral values in a democracy can be fruitfully
thought of as instrumental
in at least one sense. The
crucial point is that when
an esthetic or instrumental
value is used as a criterion
for an ethical judgment a judgment as to the
properness of alms or
actions - we should ask
whether we want that
transfer in role to occur.
V alue Conflict

The lack of clear distinctions between esthetic,
instrumental, and moral
types of values leads us to
another matter, also in-
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volving on occasion lack of clarity - the conflicts among our values.
In our culture, consistency - at least surface, public consistency - -is valued. Politicians are criticized for shifting positions; parents
worry about changing their minds in coping with their children
from one situation to the next. It is somewhat ironic, therefore,
(and the cause of much unconscious psychological manipulation) that
our value systems are inherently inconsistent - a fact that we rarely
recognize or admit. Examples are not difficult to come by. Solitude
may be important to a man - when a bridge party is involved, but
what if an invitation to a poker party is received? Honesty is important - but what if your girlfriend or wife asks if you like her new
dress - and you don't! In each case, countervailing values are likely
to prevail. The right to life is important - but how about those
who support capital punishment? Have they no basic values on their
side? How about the security of the community or even the right to
retribution?
This last example suggests that one way in which our values
lack consistency is that shifts in relative importance take place over
time. A few years ago, those who argued that the right to life should
carry the day in regard to capital punishment were in the minority.
Today, with changing court rulings and evidence that executions do
not seem to protect the community's security by deterring crime,
and perhaps also because of a greater awareness of humanness as a
result of va,rious contemporary social movements and the general
revulsion over the killing of civilians in the Vietnam War, the right
to life has taken on greater valence.
Contending with changes in values over time can be the source
of much consternation, especially as one becomes older and supposedly more conservative in his ways. But the fact that inconsistency
also exists at anyone point in time is more often overlooked and,
for that reason, is perhaps more important to a perspective from
which to view the school's role in regard to students' values.
Conflict within one's set of values is not a sign of maladaptation,
but an inevitable fact of life. On a societal level, this reality was
pointed out dramatically by the title Gunnar M yrdal (1944) and his
colleagues chose for the report of their epic study of what was then
(in the late 1930's and early 1940's) referred to as "the Negro
problem" in America. Their title, An American Dilemma, was
meant to highlight the consternation of a rationalistic, moralistic
nation whose treatment of a large segment of its population did
not (and does not) square with its basic moral values. In M yrdal's
words:
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· .. [O]ur problem is the moral dilemma of the American-the conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness
and generality. The "American Dilemma," referred to in the title
of this book, is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand,
the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the
"American Creed," where the American thinks, talks, and acts under
the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the
other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group
living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual
jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group
prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts
of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook
(p. xlvii).

A man say~ he believes in equality of opportunity as a basic
value; yet he hires no blacks in his factory or gives them only menial
jobs if hired (to a limited extent an historical example with recent
passage of equal employment opportunity laws). Does this mean
that equality of opportunity is not one of his values? We often say
that we can tell what a person values by how he acts. This is true.
But the converse - that we can tell by the same act what he does not
value - is not.
The employer may value equality of opportunity, but he also
has more specific values - the right to run his business as he pleases,
the approbation of his neighbors, and, as a negative criterion,
"uppitiness" ("Blacks are 'uppity' when they want the same job as
whites have."). These more specific values, made by the pressures
of his immediate environment more salient than equality of opportunity, lead him to act in ways that belie his commitment to equality
of opportunity. But that does not mean that equality is not one of
his values. (Just as a man's decision to play poker doesn't mean he
does not value solitude, or his decision not to tell his wife or girlfriend that her new dress is hideous doesn't mean that he does not
value honesty.) In the immediate situation, one value takes precedence over another.1
M yrdal emphasized the conflict between "moral valuations on
various levels of consciousness and generality"; in particular he stressed
the conflict between values on "the general plane" and the "specific
planes of individual and group living." But it is essential to remember that, as noted above, as we attempt to apply our values to specific
IMyrdal (1944, pp. 1027-1031) included an appendix with an austere title,
"A Methodological Note on Valuations and Beliefs." It presents an outstanding
discussion of how we manage to make the psychological manipulations necessary
to maintain an appearance of a logical order of valuations when, in fact, the
values are conflicting. (Also see Myrdal, 1944, p. xlvii.)
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situations, conflict also occurs between values on the same level of
generality - for example, between those values so basic to our conception of democracy and to which we have such strong commitments
that Myrdal (p. vivi) referred to them as the "American Creed."
Many will dispute whether there is indeed such a Creed. The basis
for that contention, as well as the importance of thinking in terms
of a set of basic democratic values - a Creed - as one considers
the school's role vis a vis students' values, should become clearer as
we move through this lecture.
The discussion of value conflict has to this point been focused
on moral values. Conflicts also occur between our esthetic values
and between our instrumental values; and, of course, between esthetic
and instrumental values (the most effective way of doing something
may not be the most pleasing esthetically, or vice versa). When
conflicts occur between esthetic or instrumental values on the one
hand and moral values on the other, the moral value usually carries
the day - especially if it is of a more general level than a personal
preference. This may be one reason for our tendency to unwittingly
convert esthetic and instrumental values to moral status.
Perhaps also another distinction needs to be made explicit. The
discussion to this point has included mention of conflict between
the values held by individuals, intrapersonal value conflict. In addition, some of the examples have illustrated interpersonal value conflict, that is, conflict between values as applied to the same situations
by different individuals. Interpersonal value conflict tends to be
fairly obvious, especially during arguments, although it can be obscured by the imprecise use of language and by making our value
claims appear to be factual claims. Intrapersonal value conflict, on
the other hand, is more likely to be overlooked. To recognize our
own value inconsistencies and the conflicting implications for our
behavior and our expectations for others is extremely threatening; in
defense, we keep our inconsistencies from ourselves.

THE DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT
Now it is time to set our concern with the nature of values
in the context of a democratic society. The school, as a formal
educational institution,)s a creature of the society it serves - in
our case, what we refer to as a democracy. For that reason the
perspective from which we view questions about schooling and
values should include a considered definition of a democratic society.
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Defining Democracy

What concept of democracy do you bring to your reflections
on the school? A common definition is that a democracy is a society
which has government by the majority. As examples, we often think
of the Greek demokratia and the New England town meeting, with
some ideal of direct participation by the citizen in mind. Our modern
form of government, called a republic, fits the majority rule definition of democracy by having each citizen participate in selecting
governmental representatives who are responsive to periodic review
at the polls. (Of course, in neither the Greek demokratia or the
New England town meeting did all of the citizens have the opportunity or the will to participate; so unelected representatives made
the decisions.) Based on this concept of democracy - that is, majority rule as the key element - we hear people complain, for
example, about court decisions limiting prayer in the classroom
because "the majority want prayer and, in a democracy, the majority
should have its will."
What, however, if a national plebiscite were held on a question
such as, "Should all Mormons be executed?" - and the response
was a clear-cut majority in the affirmative. Would we say that was
clearly a democratic decision to be carried out by the government
because it was mandated to do so by a majority vote? Undoubtedly
not!
As a matter of fact, of course, even taking such a vote would
be an unquestionable heresy to the democratic faith. People (and not
only those threatened with extinction) would be quick to respond
that democracy involves not only majority rule, but protection for
minontIes. (And, ironically, many of the same people who argue
for prayer in the school on the basis of majority rule would now
argue for protection of minorities; a good example of value conflict
and the shifting of value commitments as the pinching shoe shifts
feet. )
But why majority rule and why protection of minority rights?
The clue lies in a common response to the somewhat facetious
example of a plebiscite on genocide: "It would be inhumane." Or,
"You just don't treat humans that way." Underlying such reactions
is an ideal of humanness, that simply being human and an individual
demands certain consideration. We have referred to this in our
attempts (e.g., Oliver & Shaver, 1966; Shaver, 1964, 1967, 1968;
Shaver & Berlak, 1968) to conceptualize the essentials of democracy
as a concern for human dignity. Each individual is deserving of
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consideration 2 because he is human, and equal in that sense, if not
in wealth, intellect, or physical prowess.
Majority rule then follows as a weighing of the votes of equals,
with the scale shifting according to the number of votes on each
side. And, minority rights take on meaning as elements in our definition of human dignity. The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness, to freedom from "despotic" government, to freedom
of speech, press, religion, to due process of law, and to equal treatment by the law 3 - such values, especially as spelled out in our
basic political documents, along with others such as the right to
freedom from hunger and lack of shelter added during the Great
Depression, essentially define what we mean by dignity. A person
has human dignity when those rights and freedoms are protected.
In this definition of human dignity, basic moral values also
function as instrumental values. The defining characteristics are
instrumental in two senses: (1) They provide procedural guidelines
as they are interpreted by the courts and other governmental agencies;
and (2) preserving each helps to maintain the broader concept of
dignity. For example, as
long as the right to speak
out freely is preserved
(that is, as long as governmental policies and actions
are judged by and forced
toward meeting this criterion), it is more difficult
for the dignity of individuals to be denied on other
matters.
It is worth noting the
paradoxical position of our
courts, and especially the
Supreme Court with its
position of ultimate review,
in relation to the values in
the democratic creed. The
other two branches of gov2Scriven, 1966, builds a basis for a democratic ethic on the notion of equal
consideration. In our own work (Oliver & Shaver, 1966, pp. 46-48), we have
recognized the close relationship between equality and human dignity.
/ 3Harmon's (1964) excellent analysis raised provocative questions about which
of our political values are simply fetish commitments to convention and which
are indeeded basic to a conception of democracy.
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ernment - the executive and legislative - resting on electoral bases
reflect the democratic concern for majority rule; the courts with
their unelected judges function to protect the individual and minority rights that are also essential to our conception of democracy.
When it exercises this obligation, the U.S. Supreme Court in particular becomes subject to incredibly vituperative criticism. 4 The critics,
who would likely be the loudest to cry if their rights were violated,
evidence an unfortunate shallowness of understanding of the democratic ethos.
Human Dignity and Intelligence

Another aspect of human dignity that is critical to the consideration of the school's educational function is the ideal of man as
an autonomous, intelligent being, on both a personal and societal
level. This is not to say that our ideal man is completely free to
do as he wishes, nor that
he is an unfeeling, unemotional, totally rational being. But he is assumed 'to
have the right to self-fulfillment, to the control of
his own destiny/i and in
making his decisions, emotion and commitment are
to be tempered by reflection.
In light of the commitment to intelligence as an
essential element of humanness, it is not surprising that a democratic
society also believes in the
improvability of intellectual abilities and that the
4Dahl (1966) has suggested that the evidence is lacking to prove that the
U.S. Supreme Court has frequently gone against the wishes of the majority.
Extremely vocal minorities may cry out so loudly that it appears a majority have
been affronted.
5This is a statement of ideal, not necessarily of fact. I t raises the question
of determinism, of free will, and the extent to which man is free to make choices.
These questions are related to the ideal, but the existence of commitment to the
ideal is a separate matter, as is to some extent the question of the functionality
of the ideal.
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school is generally assumed to have responsibility for improving
decision-making abilities. The school has been clearly assigned that
part of education having to do with formalized thought, as in mathematics. On occasion, school people attempt to move beyond, into
the improvement of thinking for everyday life. But, as John Dewey
(1916, p. 148) noted, thinking involves risk: Once individuals begin
to think, the end product cannot be guaranteed. Trying to improve
the thinking skills of young people can, therefore, be dangerous.
And school people have found that when they take seriously and
act upon the responsibility for improving intelligence outside narrow
academic limits, severe criticism is often the result. The reason for
this ironic state of affairs becomes clear when we recall the conflicting nature of values and couple that understanding with the notion
of a pluralistic society.
Pluralism -

J

A Sine Qua Non of Democracy

It is not uncommon to hear people refer to monolithic societies,
especially when discussing communist nations such as the U.S.S.R.
and the People's Republic of China. The narrow application of
such a term to nations containing millions of people is somewhat
absurd. With the variety of experiences and backgrounds that individuals have in different regions and social-economic strata, even
in China, it is hard to believe that close familiarity with many
individuals in any society would reveal "massive uniformity." The
same is true, I have found, with small rural communities in Utah
that give a surface appearance of being monolithic.
Yet, there is a certain sense in which it is meaningful to talk
about monolithic societies, communities when there is a determined
drive toward uniformity; in national or local communities, and
whether of a political or religious nature, strong, frequently conscious,
efforts to subjugate individual differences often do lead to considerable uniformity, at least on the surface. In particular, describing
such a society as monolithic makes sense when it is contrasted with
another type of society - one that recognizes that people do come
from different backgrounds, in part because of religious, economic,
and social groupings, and which welcomes and encourages (albeit at
times with misgiving) the diversity of opinion that results. It is this
latter type of society that is referred to here as pluralistic.
Each of us has a set of beliefs - factual and evaluative - about
the world that determines how we behave. As Charles Beard ( 1934)
put it:
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Every human being brought up in society inevitably has in mind a
frame of social knowledge, ideas and ideals - a more or less definite
pattern of things deemed necessary, things deemed possible, and things
deemed desirable; and to this frame or pattern, his thought and action
will be more or less consciously referred. This frame may be large
or small; it may embrace an immense store of knowledge or little
knowledge; it may be well organized with respect to categories of
social thought or confused and blurred in organization; and the ideal
element in it may represent the highest or lowest aspirations of mankind. But frame there is in every human mind. This is known, if
anything is known. If the fact be denied, if a large, clarified, and
informed frame of purposes is rejected, is deliberately and ostentatiously put out at the front door of the mind, then small, provincial,
local, class, group, or personal prejudices will come in at the rear
door, occupy the background of the mind, and constitute the frame
(op. 182).

The point is that each of us has a frame of reference - what Beard
refers to as a "frame of social knowledge, ideas, and ideals" - and
that we act in accord with this frame. And, each person's frame of
reference is the result of his experiences.
There is a great deal of commonality in experience - among
members of the same family, community, social, religious, or occupational groups. Our group affiliations (formal and informal) are
fairly reliable predictors of beliefs. But no two people have exactly
the same experiences, whether during the particularly formative years
as children or during the latter maturing years as adults. Consequently, each has a somewhat different frame of reference. Emphasis
on diversity among groups should not be allowed to obscure the fact
of inevitable heterogenity within groups.
A society committed to pluralism, as ours is, recognizes the
contributions to be made by diversity. Variety may be the spice of
life, but the pressure of diverse views in a community serves more
important functions - the posing of problems overlooked by people
with highly similar outlooks on life, the availability of a greater range
of alternatives for handling problems, even the rejuvenation of commitment as clashes with those of unlike mind challenge and force a
reconsideration of one's own values. It is this, and not just dissent
for its own sake, that Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas,
himself on occasion a not-too-popular dissenter and defender of individual and minority rights, probably had in mind when he noted:
"I do not know of any salvation for society except through eccentrics,
misfits, dissenters, people who protest." Because intelligent decisionmaking is a vital aspect of the core concept of human dignity,
pluralism is a sine qua non of democracy; for without a variety of
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views, decision-making is not meaningful. In a monolithic society,
despite the form that may be followed, the result is foreordained
and procedures for decision-making are a facade.
Pluralism is, then, necessary for democracy. The recognition
and valuing of group and individual differences gives meaning to
the decision-making component of human dignity and, in addition,
provides an empirical basis for the concern for individual minority
rights that acts as a counterweight to majority rule. It is not accidental that in a period of minority group unrest, we find educators
(e.g., Nimnicht, Johnson, & Johnson, 1972) calling for a change
from a "melting pot" concept of education to a "tossed salad" one
that emphasizes the distinctiveness of different cultures and life styles.
But pluralism is not all honey and cream; it creates stresses, too,
as has been amply evident in recent years. The .§train is reflected
in the schools that must serve a pluralistic society. To determine
what one's mandates are is not easy for school people - particularly
if they ' are aware of the inevitable influence of their own frames of
reference and want their decisions to be more than an affirmation
of the prejudices and biases of the particular groups to which they
belong.
And, here we come back to an earlier comment on the importance of understanding the intertwining of the nature of values with
pluralism in answering, as parents or school people, questions about
the school and students' values. Value conflict on an intrapersonal
level is due largely to inherent inconsistencies among our commitments. On an interpersonal level, both the built-in inconsistencies
and differences in frames of reference contribute to conflict as values
are applied as criteria. This is true for esthetic, instrumental, and
moral values. But because moral values are more directly relevant
to important questions of proper aims and actions for a democratic
society, they merit special mention.

Values As a Cohesive Force
Our basic values are vague. It makes sense to talk about a
core of values that makes up a democratic ethos (M yrdal's American
Creed) only when one remembers that values do have both cognitive,
or intellectual, and emotive, or affective, meaning. People who have
commitments in common in the sense that they have similar emotive
reactions to a value term, such as freedom of speech, mayor may
not agree on the value term's cognitive, or intellectual, meaning.
Common commitments are vital to the cohesiveness of a society.
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Anthropologists pinpoint the non-intellectual nature of such commitments by referring to them as "projective reality." Such truths
are important in the same sense as elements in a religious faith, not
because of their scientific verifiability, but because of the affect of
their assumed presence.
A common core of value commitments is especially important to
a pluralistic society. As well as being cohesive on an emotive level,
it provides the basis for confrontation and debate among those with
contending points of view. Discussion as a process of communication
aimed at resolving differences and coming to acceptable aims and
actions is impossible without commitments in common, whether openly
recognized or unstated. So, the vagueness of the terms for the
core of commitments in the American Creed is functional.
At the same time, conflict arises when the values in the Creed
are applied as criteria for judging specific situations, for then their
cognitive meaning must be explicated. One person who "feels
good" about freedom of speech may think that it means that one
should be allowed to say anything he wishes; another person who
also "feels good" about freedom of speech may think that it means
that people should be allowed to say only that which does not offend
others. When four letter words were used by students on the Berkeley
campus a few years ago,
apparently to pro v 0 k e
thinking about what appeared to be indifference
in our society to the killing
in Viet N am, some saw
the students' signs and
chants as an outrageous insult. Others saw them as
a legitimate attempt to use
symbols to jar people into
thinking about a moral
Issue.
But when such conflicts
over the cognitive, or intellectual, meaning of a
value occur,6 a person
opposed to an action taken
6Note that the courts are the institution responsible for providing authoritative definitions of legal-value terms. Again, the nature of their task embroils the
courts in heated controversy.
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in the name of a value such as freedom of speech does not reject that
value, but uses other values to defend his position. Consequently, the
so-called "filthy speech movement" which was defended in the name
of free speech was opposed in the name of majority rule (preserving
the speech standards and the sensitivities of the majority) and law
and order (use of such speech was thought to be a flagrant violation
of anti-obscenity rules and also might provoke violence).
The value chosen to be emphasized (neither side was likely to
deny totally the importance of the value used by the other to support
its position) was a function of the frames of reference of the people
involved. And these differences in frames of reference are not only
acceptable, but valued in a democratic, pluralistic society.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL AND PARENTS
Now, having dealt with some important considerations of perspective, it is time to turn to a most perplexing and potentially
perilous matter: What should the school's role be in regard to students' values? To some extent, the temptation has been too great
and hints about my prescriptions for that role have been dropped
along the way. What follows, then, is an attempt to build on the
preceding discussion, emphasizing and underscoring previous points,
without, I hope, being overly redundant.
School People as Agents

It is important to approach the question about
values and schooling with
a clear recognition that
the teacher and the school
administrator are agents of
the society. That is why
considerable proportions of
this lecture have been devoted to reflections about
that society. As school
people and as parents contemplating and debating
the school's obligations and
prerogatives in the area of
values, we must constantly
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query the meaning of this authority-agent relationship, which is
confounded by the fact that individual members of the power-granting
authority (the society) are the clients of the agent.
Some implications of the authority-agent relationship bear directly on the values and schooling question. For example, because
school people are clearly in an authority-agent relationship with
society, a teacher or administrator who accepts a position in a public
school but is not committed to the basic democratic ethos of the
society has signed a contract under false pretenses. The school is not
the place for subversion of the society, in the sense of encouraging
or advocating the destruction of the values and basic governmental
forms set up, with all their limitations, to protect our conception of
human dignity. The society is clearly within its rights in demanding
that those who would use the school for subversion not be hired,
or that they be fired if discovered after employment.
Obviously, in light of the earlier discussion of values and pluralism, a decision as to what constitutes subversion may be difficult
to make. Some of the teacher's legitimate activities in regard to values
will be taken by some parents to be subversive - and they will be
in one sense, because they involve helping students to think for themselves. The end result may be rejection of some of the parents'
value definitions and priorities.
It is of utmost importance, given the conflicting nature of our
values and the pluralistic nature of our society, that the teacher
who calls to the attention of his students basic values that are
receiving short shrift in the local community not be condemned as
subversive. For, as agents of the society, the teacher and school
administrator must be beholden to a conception of democracy (as
attorneys should be responsive to a conception of justice) that goes
beyond responding to strident local interests and prejudices. The school
person is not a servant of the parents in his district. As an agent of
the society, he has a professional obligation to promote education in
the broad democratic context, not just to reflect parents' desires.
Such a stand, as any practicing teacher will tell you, can be
highly uncomfortable, if not untenable. The power to contract for
services is in the hands of local school boards, and they are of and
responsive to the local clientele - as they should be. The argument
is not that the school program should be taken out of the hands
of parents and given over to professional school people. It is rather,
that decisions about what the school should be doing should be
made in light of its role as an institution of a democratic society and
the somewhat paradoxical responsibilities of school people in their
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authority-agent, professional-client relationships with parents and
students. Understanding this position may make school people more
willing to assert themselves against unexamined local prejudices; it
should make parents more willing to tolerate if not support school
personnel in their exercise of professional responsibility.
Another implication is that as professionals, school people have
educational responsibilities that extend beyond the young people in
their classrooms or adult education in the usual sense. The school
cannot be expected to reform the society that supports it. But, as
professionals, school people should be concerned with helping their
clients - children and parents - clarify and develop their views
of the society and the school's role in that society. In short, the professional responsibility of teachers involves more than educating
children in s~bject matter specialties; it also calls for systematic
thought on their part as the basis for interaction, even educational
endeavors, with parents in the process of determining what the
school's role should be. What a blessing, of course, if parents initially
brought to such discussions a perspective - a frame of reference, if
you will - that included an understanding and appreciation of value
conflict and pluralism in the context of the democratic commitment
to human dignity. That they so rarely do points to a major failure
of the school as an institution.

Dignity and Values in the School
The democratic commitment to human dignity, especially if
students are considered to be humans/ has much to say about what
the school should be doing, and what parents should demand it
does, about values. If one takes seriously the ideal of the human
as a thinking, intelligent being with a right to control his own
destiny, it is clear that the school's role is not to impose values.
Instead, an important aspect of the school's legitimate concern with
the improvement of intelligence should be helping students to clarify
(and learn how to clarify on their own) the standards they use in
making decisions about worth. To be assisted in becoming aware
of what one's values are, to be helped to verbalize them, both in
terms of intellectual and emotive meaning, to be aided in defining
and applying value terms, and to be urged to be aware of the conse7 A comment by a well-meaning friend is of the type that suggests that such
a remark is not totally facetious. When I noted that my two children, ages 13
and 15, had enjoyed a recent skiing vacation and apparently had needed to get
away from the grind of daily life for a while, he commented, "Well I'm sure.
Children are like humans." The undoubtedly unconscious slip of tongue was
significant (shades of Freud!). Too often we forget that young people are not
like humans, they are humans!
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quences of acting in accordance with certain commitments - these
would be valuable services for students and the society.
This basic position - that the school's role is to assist students
develop a basis for their values that is as rational as possible, along
with the analytic concepts to continue the clarification after leaving
school - is a basic theme for discussing values and schooling; but
there are some variations to be played on the theme depending on
the types of values under consideration.
The School and Esthetics. In esthetics, for example, the school's
proper role in the context of human dignity is to expose the student
to different esthetic experiences and provide the opportunity for more
sophisticated esthetic judgments. There can be no basis for teaching
that one esthetic experience is "better" than another; · there are no
final criteria, for beauty resides in the eye of the beholder. Esthetic
values may be different and critical schemes may be more complex,
but the aesthete should not confuse sophistication and complexity with
ultimateness. To demand that the student adopt esthetic judgments
based on a system of values developed from a bias that precludes
the very art forms that the student finds pleasurable is not only an
unrealistic approach to education, but a denial of the student's dignity. The freedom to arrive at one's own conception of what is
pleasurable, after exposure to other forms and the consideration of
other criteria, may not be a basic value in the American Creed,
but it is consistent with the commitment underlying that creed. Of
course, that right to choice must be juxtaposed with other rights;
the right to esthetic choice, when expressed as the choice of acid
rock music that conforms to a criterion such as a loud, strong beat,
might well conflict with someone else's choice of quiet classical music,
not to mention his right to peace and quiet.
Unfortunately, music, art, and literature teachers have a tendency to forget that their esthetic judgments depend on a set of
assumptions not shared by many others, including a goodly number
of their students. Their classes sometimes take on a preachy tone
and an implicit, if very obvious, rejection of student esthetic values.
Freedom from attempts by esthetic enthusiasts and sophisticates to
impose their standards should be a by-word of democratic schools.
Instrumental Values - The Need for Dialogue. Instrumental
values call for a somewhat different tack. As with esthetic values,
the school person should take care that subtle transitions from instrumental to moral do not take place. In addition, as with other values,
the school should help the student build as rational a base as possible
for his own instrumental values. This would include involving the
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student in considering means-ends relationships, as well as asking
what end values underlie the student's instrumental ones and whether
he has unknowingly let his instrumental values take on the tone of
moral imperatives.
This type of critical examination needs to be turned inward
on the school as well. Many of the standards applied in the school
setting are instrumental, and self-examination is badly needed. Has
a criterion of classroom behavior such as having children in their
seats and quiet (often applied as the principal peeks through the
door on a brief hallway excursion) taken on value of itself? Is such
a standard actually functional in terms of the end values (the purposes and objectives) of the school, and therefore worth retaining?
Are esthetic values, such as used in judging hair length or dress
styles, being applied as if they were instrumental values without
examining the underlying assumption of functional relationships?
The professional staff of each school or school district should
undergo a critical self-assessment of its instrumental values. They
then will be ready to show basic respect for the students by explaining to them the functional nature of the instrumental values of the
school, instead of simply insisting on conformity. The justification to
students of the school's instrumental values in terms of assumed
consequences will necessitate that the purposes of the school be confided to the student. This is not a ridiculous proposition as it is the
student who is the object of those goals. A new feeling of selfrespect would be a likely outcome if students were also asked to
consider what the goals should be for their education.
If involvement in justifying values is undertaken as a serious
dialogue and not as a ruse to dupe or seduce students into conforming, students must be allowed to question the assumptions underlying standards without condescension or threats of retribution from
school people. In addition, they must be helped to develop analytic
modes of thought for identifying problems and arriving at reasoned
decisions.
The kinds of issues about school management with which students will initially be most concerned will vary from time to time.
Currently they might involve such questions as: Will long hair lead
to a breakdown in the school's educational environment? Or, at what
point is deviant clothing likely to disrupt learning? Whenever we
treat young pe9ple as humans capable of thought, we are likely to
find our conclusions challenged. This is an uncomfortable position
lfor those who have relied on an authoritarian relationship to maintain
their "superior" position over their students. Yet, in the long run,
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the sincere involvement of students in establishing the school's instrumental values would not only be in line with our commitment to
human dignity, but it could help to make the school a much more
meaningful and less inimical institution for the students. Among
other outcomes, the change in relationship between student and
institution might also make the job of teaching more pleasant for
many people. 8
Moral Values - The Crux of the Matter. The school's approach
to moral values should be along somewhat the same lines as those
proposed for esthetic and instructional standards, but with some
significant differences. Clearly, the school has the same obligation
as with esthetic and instrumental values to assist the student in
developing a basis for his moral commitments that is as rational as
possible. This holds true for the range of moral values from personal
preferences to the basic values in the Creed.
There are many facets to an adequate values education program. A basic element simply is getting students to clarify what
they believe their commitments to be (see, e.g., Raths, Harmin, &
Simon, 1966). A major emphasis particularly in moral values education, however, must be the recognition of value conflicts - in
personal preferences, in the middle level values (such as honesty)
that are so important to relations with others, in the basic moral values
that are used to justify decisions about personal and broader societal
questions of proper aims and conduct. If students were made aware
that value conflict is always latent, that having to confront value
dilemmas is not a sign of malfunctioning, and if they were helped
to learn to weigh values - for example, in terms of the consequences
of following conflicting commitments - they would be likely to
make more rational decisions. They also would be less likely to need
to use the psychological mechanisms for avoiding the recognition of
inconsistency that result in incredible, unrecognized violations of
values on the personal and social levels.
The search for value conflict is particularly important in the
application of basic values to the justification of political-ethical
decisions (ethical decisions made and carried out in the political
arena) . In our own curriculum work (e.g., Shaver & Larkins, in
8Dewey (1916, p. 159) commented that "teachers would find their own work
less of a grind and a strain if school conditions favored learning in the sense of
discovery and not in that of storing away what others pour into them . . . it
would be possible to give even children and youth the delights of personal intellectual productiveness. . . ." In short, the point here about accepting students
as fuctioning humans applies not only to the justification of instrumental values
but to the total orientation of the school curriculum.
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press), we have taught students to always look for the basic value
or values that support the positions of those with whom they disagree - or to look for the basic values being relied on by the
protagonists on an issue. The outcome for which we teach is a
"qualified decision" - one that takes into account the negative
consequences of a policy or action being supported (for example, the
recognition by a supporter of an open housing law that there will
be negative affects on owners' property rights) and the circumstances
under which one would change his position (for example, if anticipated financial losses to property owners were beyond a certain
magnitude) .
Note that the emphasis is on coming to a decision. Focusing
on conflicting values should not be allowed to become an avenue
for avoiding the making of a decision, or for arguing that anyone's
decision is as good as anyone else's. One can say, for example:
In the dispute over racial segregation, the Negro's claims for integration are supported by our commitment to brotherhood, the equality
of oppopunity, and to equal protection of the law. By the same
token, however, the segregationist's position has been defended in
terms of freedom of association, of property rights, and even of the
right to local control in such matters. Each of these is an important
American value (Shaver, 1965, p. 327).

This description of the value dilemma in one societal decision does
not argue that "each defendant's claim in a clash of values must
be given equal consideration," nor is it an example of "relativistic
thinking" ( Johanson et al., 1971, p. 9). Taking into account the
society's conflicting commitments, as well as one's own (on an intrapersonal basis, each of us tends to be committed to the values cited
on both sides of the segregation issue) is a strategy for arriving at
sounder positions. It is not an inevitable road to relativism. 9
In a democratic society, both sides of an issue are due consideration. That does not mean that differing positions automatically
take on equal weight. Judgments can be made about the complexity
and soundness, and therefore the acceptability, of students' position
statements (Newmann & Oliver, 1971, pp. 278-284; Oliver & Shaver,
1962). For example, the consequences of following one value or
another can be examined - what might be the impact on the type
of society in which we live - using the ideal of human dignity or
90liver and I (1966, p. 50) have argued that the relativistic position on
values is an inappropriate and unproductive basis for curriculum work in a
democracy.
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a similar one such as Scriven's (1966) equal consideration as the
long range goal. Many, if not most, value conflicts can be resolved
in this manner. And, the result points toward action, not away
from it.
In many cases, of course, it is not obvious that the pursuit of
one or another of the conflicting values will enhance human dignity
more in the long run. Or put differently, that judgment will depend
upon one's frame of reference. Although the teacher will want to
emphasize that it is important to make some decision (the world
does not sit still because value dilemmas are hard to resolve and
decisions are difficult to make), his task will be to be certain that
the student is being as rational as possible, not to insure anyone
answer.
One qualification must be entered. Sometimes the violations
of basic American values are so gross, as with our treatment of
blacks and women, that a teacher can only be seen as derelict in
his duty if he maintains that his role is only to point out both sides
of the issue. This might seem obvious if a history teacher did not
comment on the moral beastiality of the Nazi's "final solution" to
the "Jewish problem." Many parents would, perhaps, be amazed
at the frequency with which this piece of history is either not treated
in class or discussed as historical fact without expression of moral
repugnance. The avoidance of responsibility may not seem so obvious
(think back to the earlier discussions of prejudices and of conflict
between specific and general values) when the fact that members
of a minority group find employment, education, and housing widely
denied them on the basis of skin color (or sex) is treated (if not
avoided altogether) in class as an interesting bit of sociological data.
Inculcation and Dignity. Proposing that the teacher not hesitate to point out and even condemn extreme violations of human
dignity (even though they, too, are justified in this society by reference to basic values) raises specifically the issue of the appropriateness
of value inculcation. It is, however, to a large degree a red herring.
It has already been noted that, as damaging as it may be to the
ego of some school people, parents tend to over-estimate the school's
power to shape their children, especially outside of the specific skills
areas such as mathematics (even with all the instruction devoted to
grammar, the speech patterns of home and community generally
have sufficient staying power to resist modification). The school,
and in particular individual subject areas in the curriculum, has
limited influence as compared to the powerful reinforcers available to
parents and peers. In fact, most of the school's attempts at inculca-

-24-

tion of values - as in the esthetic areas of music and literature only establish and then confirm the student's image of school people
as rather well-intentioned individuals, but bumbling and out of contact with reality.
Although there are some individual exceptions, school people
generally lack the genuiness and the relevance to impose values on
students. Instead, their posturing alienates the young. When, however, teachers can grant students the respect that allows sincere
dialogue, the power of insight is such that value clarification in
regard to matters of importance to the student (and this includes
significant social issues) can have a great impact (see, e.g., Raths,
et aI., 1966).
What about the Parents? The thrust for rationality may be even
harder for parents to tolerate than inculcation. The human dignityrationality position insists, for instance, that the teacher must not
always insist that "Honesty is good," but ask such questions as:
"What is meant by honesty?" "What may be the consequences of
not being honest?" "Under what circumstances (Le., when confronted with the violation of what other values) could one legitimately
choose not to be honest?" This pattern of questioning would obviously be particularly vital in dealing with the basic values of the
American Creed.
In a democratic society, parents should not only tolerate such
inquiry, but should encourage it as a legitimate educational function
of the school, one that is not likely to be carried out elsewhere.
The home is a difficult environment for critical inquiry into values:
The relationships are too complex, too fraught with emotive power;
it is too difficult for the parent in his intense relationships with his
children to stand off from his own frame of reference and ask questions that are not subtle reminders of what the child ought to believe.
Moreover, our concept of human dignity demands that, as important
as the home may be as the root of one's values, some broader
context for value development is crucial - not just in the interests
of the society, but for the good of the maturing individual. Kahlil
Gibran (1923) has expressed, as only a poet could, the heart of
the meaning of human dignity for child rearing:
Your children are not your children.
They are the sons and daughters of Life's
longing for itself.
They come through you but not from you,
And though they are with you yet they
belong not to you.
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You may give them your love but not
your thoughts.
For they have their own thoughts.
You may house their bodies but not their
souls,
For their souls dwell in the house of
tomorrow, which you cannot visit, not even
in your dreams.
You may strive to be like them, but seek
not to make them like you.
For life goes not backward not tarries
with yesterday.
You are the bows from which your children
as living arrows are sent forth.
Let your bending in the archer's hand
be for gladness. . . .

The implications are potent for values education in and out of the
home. What, for example, is suggested about the basis for the frequent alienation of child and parent? Do parents unjustifiably deny
the essential dignity of the young by trying to mold them in their
own image rather than "shooting forth the arrow"?
Basic Values - A Difference. Special note must be taken of the
issue of inculcation in regard to the basic values in the Creed. School
people, as agents of the democrdtic society, have special obligations
to these values. The school in a pluralistic society has no business
imposing lesser values, even if it could; but it is obligated to teach
the basic values of the society.
This "teaching," because of the important cohesive function
of the Creed, must legitimately involve the development of emotional
commitment, especially at the elementary school level. The use of
literature and other materials that exemplify men's dedication to
and the importance of our basic democratic values (such as dramatizations of the John Peter Zenger free press episode) should be an
important part of the curriculum (see Oliver, 1960; Shaver, 1968).
Again, the issue of inculcation is likely to be an unfortunate
distracter. Most of the emotive commitment to the basic values
comes outside the school. Also, concurrent with any efforts at inculcation, values education in a democracy must also entail setting
the values in a rational context, including awareness of the conflicts
among them. The teacher, from elementary school on, should
help the student to verbalize his commitments and give them the
value labels (such as "equality of opportunity") of adult discourse.
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The student should be challenged to expana the meamng of his
values through the pursuit of questions about the consequences of
acting on the basis of different values, by considering society's attempts
through its government to define the values (such as are embodied
in legislation and court decisions), and by the drawing of analogies
to the student's own life which is in a real sense a microcosm of
the broader society's concerns and conflicts.
The use of analogy in this way is a powerful tool for value
clarification. Relationships with one's peers and between young
people and authorities tend to be, or could be, construed in terms
of the basic values. The standard of due process, for example, can
be clarified by applying it to the school's handling of discipline
problems. Concepts of equality of opportunity or equal treatment
by the law can be developed and clarified by analogy to "fairness"
in sports - in the selection of team members in the first instance,
and unbiased refereeing to the second.
Here, as in expressing rightful (not righteous) indignation over
major violations of basic values, the teacher must be careful that
he does not knowingly or unknowingly attempt to impose his own
value interpretations. Recall that the strength of the basic values
as a cohesive force for society is their vagueness in conceptual meaning; the teacher has no right to indoctrinate specific meanings that
reflect his particular niche in the pluralistic panorama. This amounts
to a caution that teachers must discriminate between value commitments and the policies they suggest. The obligation to insist that
ethical decisions be construed in terms of basic values should not
be taken to include the freedom to insist that particular political
actions be valued. As a citizen, each teacher has the right to full
political participation outside the school (a right that parents and
school administrators would do well to remember more often), but
no right to use his classroom as a soapbox for political purposes.
The teacher who uses his classroom for political advocacy opens
himself to legitimate dismissal. The decision to fire a teacher on
that ground should be made hesitantly, however. Among other
things, the difference between the sustained pressure of advocacy
and the occasional nonpolemic expression of one's opinion should
be kept in mind. The latter may be an important pedagogical move,
especially if requested by one's students. One of the school's problems is that teachers often seem plastic to students. If a teacher is
unwilling to let his students know where he stands, he loses authenticity, for young people believe that commitment is important. Moreover, if the teacher has developed in his students the skills of critical
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inquiry and if he has established a classroom atmosphere of mutual
respect in which he and his students are mutual searchers for rationally based, and often different, decisions, there is little concern that
his ideas will be unduly imposed on his students (see Shaver, 1970,
in press).
The School as an Autocratic Institution. The notion of classroom dialogue between a professional and clients who share respect
for one another presents an appropriate place for some comments
on the school's application of basic values. It is ironic that the school
in a democratic society is one of the more authoritarian institutions
of that soci~ty. This paradox compels attention not only because
the school might rightfully be expected to provide a model for the
application of democratic ideals as an educational experience, but
because students are humans to be treated in accord with the democratic ideal of human dignity. Examples such as the following
(Silberman, 1970) are all too common:
ITEM: A high school senior-eighth in a class of 779, active in a
host of extracurricular activities (student marshals, General
Organization, Key Club, after-school tutoring program, president of the Debate Society, among ~thers), and described on
the school's record as "intelligent, highly motivated and mature," with "excellent leadership and academic potentials"
-is barred from the school's chapter of the National Honor
Society on the grounds of poor character. At an open
meeting of school board candidates the preceding spring, he
had politely asked a question which implied some criticism
of the high school. In the opinion of eight of the Honor
Society's fifteen faculty advisers, none of whom had been
present at the meeting in question, none of whom had ever
met the boy in question, criticism of the high school is equivalent to disloyalty, and disloyalty constitutes bad character.
The seven faculty advisers who do know the youngster fight
for his admission but are overruled.
ITEM: (from the Montgomery County, Maryland, Student Alliance
Report): "In the way of a few examples: one student who
insisted that he would protest against the Vietnam War in
front of the school was told by a vice-principal that if the
student persisted the school official would see to it that he
could not get into college. . . . Another high school student,
a National Merit Scholarship Finalist, as it happened, was
told by his counselor that he would get a bad recommendation for college because he was a 'nihilist.' He had been
arguing with her over the values of the county school system."

The confusion of esthetic with moral values and the lack of
clarity about instrumental values that lead to the unreasonable appli-
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cation of often rather foolish hair and dress standards should be
sufficient matter for concern in a democratic society; but the denial
of the right to dissension and freedom of speech is appalling. It is
unfortunate, but highly significant, that the courts have had to tell
us - in reinstating students who had been dismissed from a school
in Iowa for wearing black armbands protesting our involvement in
Vietnam 10 that students are "persons under our constitution"
and do not lose their rights as citizens by attendance at a public
institution of education.
The situation of the school is not an easy one. The distinction
between education and schooling is particularly pertinent to its predicament. After elementary school, which often has a tremendous
impact on young children because it is a new mode of life and
introduces them to the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic, the
school becomes all too often a retentional institution. Less learning
takes place (except informally about such things as the futility of
the school as an institution) than most of us - students included often care to admit.
The "holding tank" concept of the school is rarely talked about
openly. Yet it is clear that the school serves as a solution to other
than education problems for the society. The need to keep young
people out of the labor market, to forestall the time of mature independence in a period of affluence when the labor of young people
is a threat to the economic well-being of their elders - these factors,
and the tendency to keep them below the surface so that they do
not have a direct impact on considerations of what the school should
be about, underlie much of the school's irrelevance for students.
To fully appreciate the school's uncomfortable current position, caught in the throes of young people's demands for democratization, one must take into account the society's ambivalence and
lack of clarity about the giving of adult status to young people.
How can (should?) a modem society handle the transformation
from childhood to full adult status when more adults are not urgently
needed (except, as some of the young claim, to die in the elders'
wars) as they were in yesteryears? Granting the vote to eighteenyear-oIds was a gesture toward adult status for the young. It is
probably no coincidence that that action came during a period of
vast and sometimes startling increase in awareness on the part of
the young. Greater exposure to the world through travel and telelOTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. 393 US
503, (1969).
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vision and increased sense of self and moral sensitivity are all obviously present. They no doubt bear an intricate cause and effect
relationship to the growth of groups such as the hippies, who rejected
the pat pursuit of an economically oriented life, and to our moral
uneasiness about the war in Vietnam, with its killing of innocent
civilians and the "flower of our youth" (to quote President Johnson ) .
Even with the vote, our modern society has no rite de passage
- the killing of a wild beast, a slashing of the chest after a fortnight
in the jungle, or circumcision Jor males or defloration or early
marriage for females - to mark quickly and clearly (for both the
individual and the society) the transformation from childhood to
adulthood. This attenuation of acceptance to mature status, with
so much time spent (largely involuntarily - and boringly, if not
painfully) in school as society's unexamined and largely unspeakable
solution to the problem, confronts school people with special kinds
of difficulties. Their own frequent fears of young people and the
need of some to exert authority for personal satisfaction, both of
which make it difficult to deal with young people in an open, respectful manner, do not help school people in confronting the situation.
N or is it of any great assistance that parents often share the same
fears · and needs, and so tend to identify with the school's side of
the struggle out of sympathy from their own attempts to cope with
young people who demand independence and self-esteem as their
elders rarely thought of
doing.
Receiving the vote
one sign of adulthood
has reduced somewhat the
visible span of time in
limbo between childhood
and acceptance as an
adult. But it has not reduced the ambiguity in a
significant qualitative sense
- especially for the school.
There are still many disconcerting years there for
many youth - whose maturity, in the sense of
awareness and concern beyond themselves and the
local community, exceeds
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that of their parents; who are restless and impatient because their
youthful exuberance and conviction are now coupled with an increased sense of maturity and impotence; who are capable of constructive work but have no jobs, and so are caught in relatively
unproductive servitude to their parents and the school; and, who,
with their increased awareness, find it difficult to submit meekly
and unthinkingly to authority.
It is fairly obvious that this discussion of the strain between
school and student has focused largely on adolescents. However,
Friedenberg's (1959) reminder in The Vanishing Adolescent is even
more poignant today: If adolescence is taken to be the time when
one is searching for self-identity, there is no longer a clearly demarcated adolescent stage among our young. The conscious search for
identity goes on at much earlier an age than many adults can believe,
caught as we are in our reflections about our own early years.
It does seem fairly easy, nevertheless, to discern a distinct upturn
in physical maturation at about the seventh and eighth grades. But
this developmental upswing has little significance for the respect due
the student. That is, being at an earlier stage of physical development, which may not mean lower emotional stability, is no excuse
for denying respect to younger students. The notion that dignity
caBs for respect of the individual, for freedom in developing commitments, with assistance in value clarification and definition rather
than imposition, is as applicable to elementary school students as
to secondary ones. There is no magic point at which the child
moves from being a lower animal to being a human; he is always
a human in the process of becoming - at sixty-five as at six, although
not as noticeably so. To the extent that there are differences in
emotional or intellectual sophistication, adaptions in the form of
schooling are appropriate - such as adopting procedures which call
for more and more self-responsibility as the student progresses through
the grades - but they always should be contemplated and made
in the context of dignity.
Ironically, most elementary school teachers are more concerned
with children than with subject matter, and so are more aware of
the child as a person than are secondary school personnel. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear conception of the role of the school in a
democracy, on the part of administrators, parents, and teachers, has
frequently deterred elementary teachers from exercising important
responsibilities in helping students develop their rational bases for
/ self-fulfillment.
Note also that an argument for an instructional program and
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for the administrative handling of students on the basis of the democratic ideal of human dignity should not be taken as a plea for
permissive schools. This stand is quite different from conceiving of
children or youth as nature's animals who should go unfettered so
that their personalities will not be ruined. That position can be as
disrespectfuP 1 as the current autocratic structure of the school. Rules,
guidelines for behavior, are still needed, as they are in the "adult"
society. But as there, even if imperfectly, the rules need to be developed (legislated) and applied (enforced) in a context of dignity
and mutual respect. The forms may not, and probably cannot be
the same for the adult society and the school; but to the extent that
the school's rules and administration are consciously shaped by democratic ideals there can only be improvement.
The nature of the professional-client, teacher-student relationship
must also be kept in mind. A call for mutual respect should not be
taken to imply the denial or the disparagement of the teacher's
professional competencies or responsibilities. To the contrary, one
of the arguments against democratic schooling is that it demands
too much of the teacher and the school administrator - as well as
of parents. One cannot expect school people, so the counter-argument
goes, to have the intellectual competencies and the ability to step
out of their own frames of reference that are required by the value ,
clarification process, or the patience and understanding to explore
rules with students and apply them in a democratic manner.
Actually, however, we can expect no less of our teachers. With
the current oversupply of teachers, we could begin to insist that we
have in the classroom only persons who feel and evidence concern
and respect for youth. The amount of college coursework in subject
matter areas and in pedagogy may be easier to assess, but is probably
less pertinent as a qualification for educating youth. There are some
indications from educational research findings that teachers' personalities and value systems are at least as strongly related to student
achievement and interest in science as is subject matter background
(see, e.g., Rothman, 1969). Employing teachers whose personalities
are congruent with the society's commitment to dignity can be
expected to have a learning pay-off at the same time that it improves
the general environment of the school.
llA. S. Neill's Summerhill (1960) is a thoughtful plea for permissiveness based
on the value of dignity and respect for the individual. Although Neill goes further
in his re00mmendations than is probably feasible for public schools (or for the
personnel of many private ones), the basis for his approach is significantly different from that of the sympathetic bleeding heart whose benevolent ministrations
deny children the respect due them.
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Obviously, too, another constraint is that any school refonn
based on the model of democracy advocated here must exemplify
the concept of value conflict. The refonners would not demand total
freedom for youth, but a balancing of rights against rights, or perhaps
more appropriately, of rights against responsibilities. Applying our
basic values to decision-making in the political-social context raises
difficult questions; that will also be the case in the school. Questions
such as, When does one student's freedom of expression - through
speech or other symbols such as hair or clothes - interfere unduly
with another student's right to an orderly, quiet educational atmosphere? are not easy to answer. But they must be raised and confronted as part of the educational process. Students must be involved
in dialogue and allowed to assist in making decisions cast in the
recognition of value conflicts and the consideration of the consequences of following one value criterion as against another.
As long as school people and parents make decisions and impose
them on the young, it is hardly realistic to insist on responsibility
to self and to others; responsibility assumes the freedom to make
mistakes (which, of course, adults do all the time, but rarely admit
to their youthful subordinates). Few would advocate turning the
young loose in the school without guidance; but when the consequences do not seriously affect other persons or, if personal, do not
involve serious threat to life, limb (as with a young child playing
with fire), or future happiness (a judgment we should always be
chary of making for others), it would be better to err in the direction
of permitting blunders - in part for the learning involved. We
must insist that the student live with the consequences of his decisions.
If bailed out of any difficulties by a well-meaning (but disrespectful)
adult, he will learn little about responsibility. In addition, the
dialogue among students, teachers, and administrators must include
the weighing of the value of independence against the ideal of
maturity of judgment.

SUMMING UP
The classroom could be an exciting, meaningful place for youth
(beyond the initiatory stages of elementary school), rather than
a place to mark time fulfilling arbitrary and irrelevant assignments12
12Not so, of course, to those students who are oriented toward dealing with
abstractions, particularly in the subject areas of the school. Academician-parents
must be cautious in their judgments about the proper ingredients of schooling.
Their children, as a result of the atmosphere in the home, are more likely to value
conceptualizing for its own sake. Intellectual masturbation is an all-too-frequent
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while waiting to become an "adult." School people have too long
ignored their basic responsibility as agents of a democratic society
to maintain an institution whose processes are modeled on democratic ideals and whose curriculum reflects the democratic concern
with dignity and rationality. Parents, with their pressing concern
for socializing their offspring in their own image, have often been
too tolerant of the school's deviations from democratic noDUS. Partly
out of self-interest, they have leaned toward over-respect of the schoo],
and as a corollary demanded compliance and obedience toward the
institution and its personnel at the expense of the self-respect of the
child. A redress of balance is needed, not as retribution for the
school's past sins, but to bring the institution in line with the ideals
of society it serves. Only then will the school be able to tolerate and
help shape the aspirations of youth in line with the promise of our
democratic commitment to human dignity.

source of pleasure among those who consider themselves the "intellectual elite"which, of course, they belong to because they define it themselves in terms of
abstract conceptualizing, rather than the type of intellectual problems that businessmen and other non-academicians commonly deal with in their daily lives.
College-bound students (which most of the children of academician parents are)
are likely to conform even though they see school programs and classroom assignments as empty requirements to be fulfilled at whatever level necessary to obtain
another goal-entrance to college, where, it is hoped, formal education will be
meaningful.
On the other hand, it is also worth noting that university professors, particularly those in the social sciences, are likely to be more liberal in their political
beliefs than is the general public. Personal experience indicates that such people
are more likely than many to see the repression of their children by the schools
as a more compelling concern than the form of academic achievement.
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